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Abstract 
 
Few issues are more controversial in the contemporary globalization debate than the 
effects of trade liberalization on poverty and well-being in low-income countries. The 
question of how changes in trade policy affect child labor and schooling is 
particularly contentious. We study the relationship between changes in trade policy 
and schooling and child labor using detailed household level data from the Indian 
National Sample Survey (NSS) spanning the period of trade liberalization initiated in 
1991. We explore the causal link between liberalization and changes in child labor by 
relating child labor to district and inter-temporal variation in exposure to tariff cuts. 
During the time period of our study, India experienced dramatic declines in child 
labor and increases in schooling attendance. However, we find that children living in 
districts more exposed to tariff cuts observed smaller declines in child labor and 
smaller increases in school attendance. We believe the findings reflect some of the 
adjustment costs associated with trade liberalization, and they illustrate how even 
temporary adjustment costs may have long-term effects on the impacted. 
 
 
 
Contact Information 
 
Eric Edmonds, Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, 6106 Rockefeller Hall, 
Hanover, NH 03755, USA, Tel: 603-646-2538, Email: eric.edmonds@dartmouth.edu; 
NBER. 
 
Nina Pavcnik, Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, 6106 Rockefeller Hall, 
Hanover, NH 03755, USA, Tel: 603-646-2538, Email: nina.pavcnik@dartmouth.edu; 
NBER and CEPR. 
 
Petia Topalova, Department of Economics, Yale University, Email: petia@mit.edu; 
IMF. 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Marc Melitz for useful comments. We are grateful for the support of the 
National Science Foundation on this project, and Pavcnik is also grateful for financial support on this 
project from the Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College. 
 
 1
1. Introduction 
Trade liberalization is one of the most common policy prescriptions offered to initiate the 
process of poverty eradication in today’s poor countries.  Most would agree that growth is likely 
the most important channel through which trade might lower poverty in the long run.1  However, 
recent research has emphasized the importance of short- to medium- run consequences of trade 
reforms.  This focus is in part motivated by very limited mobility of individuals across industries 
and/or regions within poor countries in response to large trade policy shocks (see, for example, 
Harrison and Hanson (1999) and Revenga (1997) for Mexico, Currie and Harrison (1997) for 
Morocco, Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) for Colombia, Topalova (2004) for India).  
Consequently, Hanson (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), and Topalova (2004) find 
differential impact of globalization on poverty across industries/regions within poor countries 
that persist over a relatively long period (at least 8-10 years) after the reforms.   
An important aspect of poverty in poor countries is a high level of child labor coupled 
with low school attendance rates.  For example, in India, 32 percent of children ages 10-14 report 
working as their usual principal activity and 98 percent of these working children do not attend 
school at the beginning of our sample in 1983.  In general, only 54 percent of children ages 10-
14 report attending school in 1983.  Trade reforms, by differentially altering the local economic 
environment in which families operate and the resources available to families, might affect 
parents’ decision to invest in children.  This study considers how trade policy changes in India 
have affected the labor force status and schooling of India’s children. 
Understanding the effect of trade policy on education and child labor is crucial for several 
reasons.  First, human capital accumulation is one of the main correlates of long run growth 
(Barro 1991).  Trade policy induced changes in a parent’s ability or incentives to invest in the 
schooling of children might then translate into long-term consequences for growth.  Second, the 
                                                 
1There is convincing evidence on the link between growth and poverty (see Ravallion (2004) for survey).  The 
empirical relationship on trade and growth has been more elusive (see Hallak and Levinsohn (2004), Winters et.al 
(2004) for recent overviews).   
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prevalence of child labor in an area may have general equilibrium effects on wages (Basu and 
Van 1998) that in turn influence occupational choices and create intergenerational poverty traps 
(Banerjee and Newman 1993).  If trade policy can influence child labor decisions, then there 
may be persistent, long-term effects.  Third, empirical evidence on the link between international 
trade and child labor is important for the debate on the effectiveness of trade sanctions to combat 
child labor by lowering employment opportunities for children.2  While the trade policy 
considered in the current study (i.e. unilateral reductions in import tariffs by a poor country) 
differs from the policy that is the focus of discussion (namely, the imposition of tariffs on 
exports from poor country by a trading partner), both policies entail similar underlying 
mechanisms through which trade policy-via changes in product prices-might affect child labor 
and schooling.  
Theory work on child labor emphasizes the importance of poverty (Basu and Van 1998) 
or phenomena associated with poverty such as credit constraints (Baland and Robinson 2000, 
Ranjan 2000) as determinants of high levels of child labor and low schooling rates in poor 
countries.3  Labor demand conditions also play a role (Basu and Van 1998, Maskus (1997), 
Brown 2000, Dixit 2000, Ranjan 2001).  Ultimately, how trade affects child labor/schooling 
depends on the direction and magnitudes of the effect of trade policy changes on these channels.  
The existing empirical work in a cross-country setting documents a negative association between 
openness and child labor (Shelburne (2001), Cigno, Rosatti, and Guarcello (2002), Edmonds and 
Pavcnik (2004)), and this relationship appears to be driven mostly by the well-documented 
positive relationship between trade and income (see Frankel and Romer (1999), Irwin and Tervio 
(2001)).  While one advantage of a cross-country approach is that it does not rely on a particular 
                                                 
2 For example, the U.S. Congress has repeatedly considered legislation that would prohibit imports into the United 
States of all products made with child labor.  Under threat of such sanctions, export oriented garment factories in 
Bangladesh released more that 10,000 child workers under the age of 14 in the mid 1990s.  More recently, the U.S. 
House of Representatives has deliberated the "Child Labor Elimination Act" that would impose general trade 
sanctions, deny all financial assistance, and mandate U.S. opposition to multilateral credits to 62 developing 
countries with a high incidence of child labor.  The aim of this type of policy is to coerce changes in domestic 
policies in low income countries.    
3 See Basu 1999, Basu and Tzannatos 2003 for surveys of theory work on child labor. 
 3
case study, problems with the endogeneity of trade and of data comparability across countries 
limit inference.4  The literature that considers how trade policy affects child labor and schooling 
within a country identifies geographic differences in exposure to trade policy changes by 
tracking variation in product prices within country over time, and finds evidence for importance 
of income playing an important role (Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005b)) but also instances where 
labor demand effects dominate the income effects (Krueger 2004).5   
In this paper, we empirically examine how heterogeneity in the impact of trade policy 
changes within a country can be used to evaluate the consequences of trade reforms for 
schooling and child labor.  In particular, we study the implications of trade policy for child labor 
and schooling with within-country data from India using detailed household level data from the 
Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) that surveys over 130,000 children from 1987 to 1999 and 
spans the period of India’s unilateral economy-wide trade liberalization launched in 1991 that 
drastically lowered the average tariffs from 83 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 1997.   
Our study aims to make several contributions to the existing empirical literature on the 
role of trade policy for child labor and schooling in developing countries.  Our first contribution 
is methodological.  The main identification problem that limits the empirical evidence is the 
endogeneity of trade:  the resource endowments and policies which determine trade flows also 
influence child labor supply and are difficult to fully control for in an empirical setting.  We 
explore the causal link between liberalization and child labor and schooling by relating child 
labor/schooling to regional and intertemporal variation in import tariffs.  This is to our 
knowledge the first study on the topic that addresses the main identification problem in the 
                                                 
4Edmonds and Pavcnik (2004a) address the endogeneity of trade by relying on trade based on geography as an 
instrument for actual trade as in Frankel and Romer (1999).  However, the implications of the results for policy are 
less clear, because trade policy may have different effects on child labor/schooling than trade based on geography. 
5 Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) study the effect of rice market liberalization on child labor in Vietnam during the 
1990s using a panel of rural households spanning the liberalization episode.  They find that rice price increases are 
associated with declines in child labor and that these effects vary across children living in households that differ in 
their exposure to rice prices as consumers and producers (with income effect playing an important role).  Kruger 
(2004) repeats this analysis for coffee market liberalization in Nicaragua and finds that higher coffee prices induce 
more child labor, likely because the substitution effect of higher coffee prices exceeds the income effect. 
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research on trade and child labor/schooling by using information on actual tariff policy (rather 
than product prices) as a source of identifying variation.  Trade policy measures are less likely to 
suffer from endogeneity and omitted variable biases than prices.  Of course, political economy 
models of trade policy formation (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1994) suggest that trade policy 
itself might be an endogenous outcome of a political process.  While this is likely the case with 
pre-reform tariff levels in India, as we argue in detail in section 2.1, the nature of the reform in 
India provided little scope for various interest groups to influence trade policy changes.  Trade 
liberalization was largely unanticipated, externally imposed, and the reform changed the 
structure of protection toward more uniform tariff rates across sectors.  Thus, the usual concerns 
about the endogeneity of trade policy changes are likely small in the current context.  
Our empirical methodology is based on geographical diversity in how families are 
exposed to India's trade reforms.  India is divided into almost 450 districts that differed in 
industrial composition before the trade liberalization and hence exposure to trade liberalization.  
We exploit this variation in pre-liberalization industrial composition across districts in India.  
The interaction between the share of a district’s population employed by various industries prior 
to trade reforms and the reduction in trade barriers in these industries provides a measure of the 
district’s exposure to foreign trade.  Our empirical work thus relies on differential impact of trade 
reform across regions.  
There are several limitations in our study that are important to its interpretation.  First, 
our empirical work focuses on a trade liberalization episode that consisted of a unilateral 
reduction in import barriers, so we cannot examine how the elimination of trade barriers by a 
trading partner affects child labor/schooling.  That said, the unilateral trade liberalizations have 
recently been widely used in the developing world and import tariff reductions affect child labor-
via product prices- through similar underlying mechanisms as trade policies of trading partners 
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(albeit magnitudes and directions of the effects might obviously differ). 6  Second, we rely on the 
differential impact of trade reform across districts within a country, so our approach cannot 
identify to what extent trade reform has contributed to the economy-wide changes in child 
labor/schooling.  However, the partial equilibrium framework does not require the strong 
assumptions needed to answer the broader question in the general equilibrium framework.  It 
allows us to link child labor and schooling to trade liberalization using plausibly exogenous 
variation in trade policy over time, so that identification of the trade policy effects is arguably 
more compelling.  Moreover, differential responses of schooling/child labor to tariff reductions 
across regions are a crucial component of understanding the adjustment to trade reform in a 
setting where labor is very immobile geographically. Topalova (2004b) illustrates that 
individuals rarely move across districts/industries subsequent to trade shocks in India.  This 
experience is not unique to India, but seems to characterize virtually every recent trade 
liberalization episode in the developing world (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004a) for a survey).  
Finally, there is still little known about the short- and medium-run effects of trade reforms. 
Given that the adjustment costs associated with trade liberalization are potentially high, a study 
of the short- or medium-run effects is important from a policy point of view, especially since the 
negative stance towards free trade is often attributed to the negative effects that reforms are 
expected to have in the short run.  
 In addition to its methodological contribution, this study also expands our understanding 
of how trade policy changes affect schooling and child labor during an economy-wide trade 
reform.  Previous work (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005b, Kruger 2004) has focused on the effects 
of agricultural trade liberalization and child labor in a setting where kids mostly work on a 
family farm.  This is not surprising given that most child labor worldwide occurs in nontraded 
sectors or on family farms.  However, some argue that agricultural trade liberalizations 
(especially in countries where a vast majority of population relies on self-employed agriculture) 
                                                 
6Most developing countries that were members of GATT/WTO have not participated in tariff reducing GATT 
rounds and have thus liberalized trade policy through unilateral trade liberalizations.   
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might provide very special case studies because income effects associated with self-employed 
agriculture might play an extremely consequential role that would not be as pronounced during 
an economy-wide trade reform.  In addition, some suggest that child work for wages (rather than 
work on family farm) is the type of work that interferes most with schooling and is thus of 
greater policy interest.  While these are obviously controversial claims, the Indian trade 
liberalization enables us to examine whether and how an economy-wide trade policy change in a 
country with more developed nonagricultural sector (and thus greater potential for children to 
work for wages in nonagricultural sector) affects child labor and schooling decisions.  
 We find that children living in districts more exposed to tariff cuts observed smaller 
declines in child labor and smaller increases in school attendance than the rest of India.  Previous 
work by Topalova (2004b) finds that districts that experienced larger average tariff declines 
observed smaller declines in poverty.  Thus, the relationship between child labor/schooling and 
district’s exposure to trade found in our study is consistent with the importance of trade induced 
income effects in families’ child labor/schooling decisions as observed in Edmonds and Pavcnik 
(2005b).  In that study, Edmonds and Pavcnik find declines in child labor associated with rising 
incomes in the context of Vietnam's liberalization of rice trade.  In the present Indian case, child 
labor fails to decline and schooling fails to increase in areas that also do not experience the 
declines in poverty that occur in the rest of India. 
In the next section, we briefly describe the characteristics of trade reforms in India that 
are crucial for our empirical framework, and child labor and schooling data used in the analysis. 
In section 3, we discuss the theoretical relationship between child labor/schooling and import 
tariffs.   Section 4 outlines our empirical methodology and presents our basic findings; 
robustness is explored in section 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background on Indian Trade Liberalization and Data 
2.1 Trade Policy  
 7
India provides an excellent setting to study the relationship between trade policy, child 
labor and schooling.  In August 1991, India launched a dramatic, unilateral trade liberalization.7 
The reforms were initiated in the context of the 1991 currency crisis as a condition of IMF 
bailout.  Several features of the reform are crucial for our empirical work.  First, because tariffs 
were high prior to the reform, the reform drastically reduced the level of tariff protection.  Figure 
1 portrays evolution of average tariffs over time and shows that average tariff declined from 83 
% in 1991 to 30% in 1997.8  These tariff cuts encompassed all sectors of the economy.  Figure 2 
depicts industry tariffs in 1987 and 1997 and demonstrates that virtually all industries 
experienced large tariff declines.  Second, the liberalization was instigated as part of the IMF 
bailout conditions in response to the 1991 currency crisis and came as a surprise (Hasan et al, 
2003).9  The reforms were thus unanticipated in the sense that they were unlikely foreseen in 
child labor and schooling decisions made during the 1980s and in the industrial composition 
before the crisis.  Third, the reform drastically changed the structure of protection across 
industries by reducing the differences in tariffs across industries.  Figure 3 depicts declines in 
industry tariffs between 1997 and 1987 (a decline is a positive number) and pre-reform tariffs in 
1987 and indicates a move toward a more uniform tariff structure across industries:  industries 
with larger pre-reform tariffs experienced larger tariff cuts.  This is not a pattern that would be 
expected by an observer sensitive to political economy concerns.  This pattern might in part 
reflect that the reforms were externally imposed, which could have diminished industry’s ability 
to influence changes in trade policy.10  Fourth, Indian trade reform has potentially important 
implications for those living in rural areas (where agriculture is a predominant activity) and 
urban areas (where manufacturing is more pronounced) because tariff reductions not only 
encompassed the manufacturing sector and mining, but also agricultural products.  This is 
                                                 
7Although India was a member of GATT since 1947 it did not participate in tariff reducing GATT rounds. 
8The sources of tariff data are various publications of the Indian Ministry of Finance.   
9This crisis was in part triggered by the sudden increase in the oil prices due to the Gulf War in 1990, the drop in 
remittances from Indian workers in the Middle East, and the political uncertainty surrounding the fall of a coalition 
government and assassination of Rajiv Gandhi which undermined investor’s confidence. 
10 In fact, the IMF conditions required a reduction in the level and dispersion of tariffs (Chopra et al., 1995). 
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illustrated in Figure 4 that depicts average tariffs for cereals and oilseeds, agriculture (other than 
cereals and oilseeds), and manufacturing and mining over time.  The figure suggests that all 
sectors experienced tariff reductions, albeit the tariff reductions were less pronounced in cereals 
and oilseeds.  
 Finally, India is divided into almost 450 districts.  These districts differ in terms of 
industrial composition before the trade liberalization and thus exposure to trade liberalization.  
This provides geographic and time heterogeneity in exposure to trade policy within India.  Our 
identification strategy exploits this variation in pre-liberalization industrial composition across 
districts in India.  The interaction between the share of a district’s population employed by 
various industries on the eve of trade reforms and the reduction in trade barriers in these 
industries provides a measure of the district’s exposure to foreign trade.11 
 In particular, we rely on district-level measures of trade policy as in Topalova (2004b). 
District d’s exposure to trade liberalization at time t is measured by the 1991 employment 
weighted average nominal ad-valorem tariff at time t.  For each industry i in district d, we 
compute employment Empi,d using 1991 population and housing census12 and create industry 
employment weights ,,
,
i d
i d
i d
i
Emp
w
Emp
≡ ∑ that are normalized to sum to one for each district.   Our  
measure of district’s exposure to trade reform at time t is the employment weighted sum of 
industry-specific national tariff (i.e. tariffi,t) at time t: , ,*d t id i t
i
tariff w tariff= ∑ .13  Since this 
computation uses district specific employment weights based on industrial composition that is 
                                                 
11The district is an administrative unit within the state.  Boundaries of the districts have been relatively constant 
since colonial times, though many of the older districts have been split into two or more modern districts. The 
assumption that we are making by looking at the district is that it is the appropriate labor and capital market.  Given 
the very low migration across districts (see Topalova (2004b)) and large disparities across districts,  it does not seem 
unreasonable to make this assumption. Two recent papers,  Banerjee and Iyer (xxxx), and Iyer (xxxx), also use 
variations across districts to study the effect of colonial rule.  Duflo and Pande (2004) use district level analysis to 
examine the effect of infrastructure on poverty/inequality. 
12Because the census does not distinguish among various subcategories of agriculture, employment information on 
subcategories of agriculture from the 1987 (i.e. 43rd) round of the National Sample Survey is used.   
13Because census data distinguishes between rural and urban population in each district, we can compute district 
specific exposure to trade that varies across rural and urban areas.   
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determined prior to trade reform, this allows us to causally interpret the correlation between the 
levels of child labor and trade exposure. A similar measure has also been created at a region 
level.14 
 Note that the above trade measure takes into account the employment in non-traded and 
traded industries within a district.  Workers in nontraded industries are assigned zero tariffs in all 
years and nontraded industries consist of services, trade, transportation, construction, and 
growing of cereals and oilseeds.15  This leads to average tariffs at the district level whose level is 
substantially lower than the tariff rate on traded goods with tariffs (for example, in table 1 
compare 8 percent to 88 percent in 1987/88).  The above tariff measure is sensitive to the share 
of individuals working in non-traded sectors, and might be correlated with initial poverty in a 
district.  As we discuss in detail in section 5, this might bias our results if there are underlying 
latent differences in trends in child labor across districts that depend on pre-reform industry 
composition (and thus poverty).  Subsequently, we also create a measure of average tariffs that 
depends only on employment in traded sectors that experience changes in tariffs over the period 
of study.  This measure is constructed along the same lines as district tariff measure, except that 
weights are created using only the employment in traded sectors within a district.  We call this 
the average traded tariff for the district and label it dtTrTariff .  This tariff measure will be 
correlated with the district average tariff dtTariff , but variation in dtTrTariff  won't be influenced 
directly by the size of the non-traded sector.  Finally, in our analysis we will also examine to 
what extent our results are driven by tariff reductions in agricultural sector, or mining and 
manufacturing.  We thus also create a tariff measure that captures average agricultural tariff in a 
                                                 
14India is divided into 77 regions and a region is a collection of several districts.  Creation of regional tariffs enables 
us to check the robustness of our findings.   
15Topalova (2004b) argues that the latter two categories should be treated as non-traded because all product lines 
within cereals and oilseeds were canalized (i.e. imports were allowed only by the state trading monopoly) until 2000 
and the tariffs on all product lines under the growing of cereals are zero throughout the period of our sample. 
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district and a tariff measure that captures average tariff in mining and manufacturing in a 
district.16  Table 1 summarizes these tariff measures at a district and regional level.  
 While the measure of trade policy used in our analysis is based on tariffs, Indian trade 
reform also significantly lowered non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs), albeit NTB reductions 
occurred at a slower pace (especially in agriculture).  We focus on tariffs because they are more 
transparent and easier to comparably measure across industries and time than NTBs, and NTB 
data is not available at a level detailed enough for empirical analysis.  Moreover, additional 
considerations suggest that our focus on tariffs rather than NTBs is unlikely problematic.  First, 
exclusion of NTBs from the analysis would be worrisome if NTBs increased in response to tariff 
reductions.  This was not the case in India.  The limited data on NTBs suggest that tariffs and 
NTBs are positively correlated during this period (Topalova 2004b).  Second, the fact that NTBs 
were eliminated at a slower pace than tariffs (especially in the agriculture) might, if anything, 
attenuate our findings on the impact of trade reform when we focus on tariffs as a measure of 
trade policy.  Third, trade policy changes are mirrored in increases in imports and exports so that 
the share of merchandise trade in GDP increased from about 10% in 1986/87 to about 19% in the 
late 1990s.  Finally, since most NTBs were eliminated by 1998, we can check the robustness of 
our findings by focusing on tariff variation from the 43rd and 55th round of the household survey 
and ignoring the 50th round that takes place when many of the NTBs continued to be in place.  
Preliminary analysis (note: not yet included here) along these lines yields virtually identical 
findings to those reported in the paper.   
2.2 National Sample Survey 
Our analysis of the relationship between district exposure to trade and child labor/ 
schooling is based on two rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) in India.  We match 
district-level information on tariffs described in the previous section to household survey data 
                                                 
16The district specific agricultural (mining and manufacturing) tariff uses the share of employment in a subcategory 
of agriculture (mining and manufacturing) in total agricultural employment (mining and manufacturing 
employment) in a given district as weights.   
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from the 38th (Jan-Dec 1983), 43rd (July 87-Jun 88), and 55th (July 1999 - June 2000) rounds of 
the NSS.17  The NSS is a multipurpose household survey that provides information on household 
expenditures, household demographic characteristics, education, and employment among others. 
The surveys are nationally representative and large in scale with approximately 75,000 rural and 
45,000 urban households in each survey round.  We analyze the activities of over 130,000 
children ages 10-14.18 
Although the NSS is a repeated cross-section at the level of individuals (households), the 
data has a panel dimension at a district level.  Topalova (2004b) has matched districts across 
rounds and in so-doing adds this geographic panel dimension to the data.  As a result, this is one 
of the first studies that uses this rich micro data set to study the effect of policies that vary across 
districts of India and over time on various outcomes of interest.  The district-panel dimension of 
the data significantly improves a researcher’s ability to separate the effects of trade policy from 
other district-specific factors that could be influencing child labor and schooling.  Our analysis 
relies crucially on this data feature.   
We consider several measures of the activities of children that have been asked in a 
consistent manner in each of the survey rounds.  We define a child's work status based on survey 
question about the child's usual principal activity.  The question distinguishes between the 
following categories of work: regular salaried/wage employee, casual wage laborer, begging, 
work in a household enterprise (farm or non-farm), and domestic work.  A child is labeled 
working if his/her usual principal activity is in one of the above work categories.  It is possible 
that a child's principal activity might be work while the child also attends school.  We define an 
                                                 
17In particular, the tariff measure for 43rd round (i.e. 1987/88) is based on tariff information for 1987.  No detailed 
earlier data on tariff is available prior to 1987, but there were no major trade reforms prior to 1991.  Tariff measure 
of 55th round (i.e. 1999/00) is based on tariff information for 1997.  We use a tariff lag because there is likely some 
delay in how national policies affect regional outcomes.  We do not have data on 1983 tariffs (38th round of NSS), so 
we use 1983 data only in a robustness check that our results are not driven by preexisting trends in outcome 
variables.    
18The sample is restricted to children ages 10 - 14.  Very few children below the age of 10 work and 14 is typically 
an upper bound on the definition of a child in child labor conventions such as the International Labor Organization's 
C182 on the worst forms of child labor.   
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indicator attend school that is one if a child attends school regardless of his/her usual principal 
activity based on the information from the household roster.  We also define an indicator for 
whether a child works as a principal activity and does not attend school (i.e. work only). 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on child labor and schooling between 1983 and 
1999/2000 for India as a whole and the rural and urban samples separately.  Each mean in Table 
2 is weighted to be nationally representative for the given year.  Several interesting patterns 
emerge.  First, the comparison of proportion of children that work and the share of children that 
work and do not attend school suggests that most children that report working as a primary 
activity (including domestic work), do not attend school.  Thus, our measure of child labor is of 
interest to researchers concerned only about human capital accumulation.  Second, while child 
labor is prevalent in India (especially in rural India), the fraction of children working as a usual 
principal activity has been declining over time from 31.6 percent in 1983 to 12.4 percent 
1999/2000.  At the same time, the share of children that report attending school has increased 
from 54 percent to 75.8 percent.  Our empirical analysis will consider whether any of these 
changes are related to changes in district specific changes in import tariffs over time.   
In our future analysis we will also focus on subcategories of child work: market work and 
domestic work.  A child works in market work if his/her usual principal activity is working for 
wages (as regular salaried/wage employee or as casual wage laborer), in a household enterprise 
(farm or non-farm), or in begging.  Domestic work includes attending domestic duties and free 
collection of goods (vegetables, roots, fire-wood, cattle feed,..), sewing, tailoring weaving, etc. 
for household use.  Policy tends to focus more on market work (and especially wage work), but a 
basic model of time allocation (e.g. Becker 1965) would suggest that movements in market work 
and domestic work should be related.  In table 2, it is evident that working children are almost 
evenly split between market work and domestic work and that declines in both types of work are 
similar over time.  The largest employment category within market work is in a household 
enterprise such as a farm or family business which we believe is particularly substitutable with 
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domestic work.  Hence, an important component of our future analysis will be to consider how 
the type of work performed by children is related to changes in the structure of trade protection. 
The NSS is unusual in both its sample size and its detailed questionnaire.  In addition to 
information about the activities of children, we use information on child’s demographics (gender, 
age, completed education) and child’s household attributes (religion, caste or tribe, primary 
activity, household expenditure per capita, household size, information on household head 
(literacy, competed education, gender, age)) in our analysis.  However, one important limitation 
of the NSS is that, as a household survey, it inevitably misses children that do not live within the 
sampling frame.  Especially vulnerable groups like sex workers, bonded laborers, street children, 
and the homeless are likely missing from the data.  This data limitation means that we will not be 
able to infer anything about changes in the status of these children during India's trade 
liberalization.  However, we are able to evaluate whether our sample changes in a substantive 
way over time and from this infer whether there is systematic selection into the NSS sample that 
is correlated with trade policy changes.  Thus, while certain vulnerable groups will be missing 
from our analysis, the extent to which this affects inference is straightforward to assess (and does 
not appear to be an issue in our preliminary analysis). 
3. Theoretical Motivation 
Within the trade literature, there are several papers that consider the relationship between 
trade and child labor in a general equilibrium setting (see Ranjan (2001), Brown (2000), Dixit 
(2000), Maskus (1997) for examples).  As the main contribution of our paper is empirical, our 
goal in this section is to simply summarize the mechanisms that can be in play in as transparent a 
way possible.  As such, we treat the general equilibrium effects emphasized in the literature as an 
exogenous change in the parameters of the household's schooling decisions. 
For simplicity, there is one child per household and two goods in the economy.  One 
good is a consumption good that can be produced at home or purchased in a formal market for a 
price p.  The other good is a capital good that cannot be produced at home but is used in 
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production at home.  There are no binding constraints on labor supply outside of the household, 
although we assume that households cannot hire in for home production.  Let market clearing 
wages be defined as w and they are exogenous to a household.  Because of the absence of 
constraints on employment outside of the household, equilibrium requires that if a child works 
both inside and outside of the household, the value of child time in home production is just the 
child's market clearing wage.  Total adult labor supply is assumed to be completely inelastic with 
respect to the liberalization of trade.19  This simplification allows our discussion to focus more 
directly on the child's schooling and labor supply decisions at the expense of missing interaction 
between child and adult labor supply.  Denote total income from non-child labor sources (i.e. 
adult labor) as Y.   
Let r be the market price of capital used in home production.  It is exogenous to the 
household.  K denotes the capital stock used in production.  In our context, we will think of 
capital as also encompassing all intermediate inputs in production.  Denote LH as child labor 
used in home production in the constant returns to scale production function F(LH,K).   c is the 
(composite) consumption good, so the family's budget constraint is:  
( , )H Mpc Y pF L K wL rK= + + − .  LM is child labor supplied outside of the household.  
Preferences are additively separable in schooling S and consumption of c and have the 
representation: ( , ) ( ) ( )U c S u c v Sδ= + where δ is the (future) market return to a unit of schooling.  
For simplicity, we assume certainty in the return to schooling, and the function v reflects any 
discounting, agency problems, etc.  We assume positive diminishing marginal utility in both c 
and S and abstract from financial motives for investing in schooling.  The child faces a time 
constraint such that time spent in work outside the household, inside the household, and in 
school must add to 1:  1 M HS L L= + + .  In this set-up we assume that all non-work time goes 
towards schooling.  In so doing, we consider schooling to also embody other inputs into child 
                                                 
19This assumption is often made in trade literature.  The assumption is useful in the present discussion but does not 
influence our empirical work. 
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human capital accumulation including play and leisure and abstract from the so-called "idle" 
children problem. 
Note that the allocation of the child's labor inside and outside of the household will 
depend on the rental price of capital to the household, because child labor is allocated between 
the household to keep the value of labor's marginal product in the household equal to the wage.  
Since the focus of this study is on the allocation of child time between work (inside or outside 
the household) and schooling, we do not further discuss the allocation of child labor between the 
household and the formal labor market and the interplay of capital prices in that decision. 
The determinants of total child labor supply and schooling are the same in this setting.  
Hence, we frame our discussion in terms of schooling, but the same factors also affect labor 
supply.  Denote the household's demand for schooling as: ( , , , , )S D p w r Yδ= .  Totally 
differentiating, we have five basic mechanisms through which the reduction of import tariffs in a 
district can influence child labor supply: 
D D D D DdS dp dw d dr dY
p w r p
δδ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + + + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .   (1) 
In discussing the mechanisms through which liberalization affects schooling, we proceed through 
each term of (1), holding all other factors fixed (that is, when we discuss the effects of a change 
in i , we set all derivatives not i equal to 0).  First, the reduction in import tariffs changes final 
consumption prices.  In the present case, we assume that the effect on the price level is negative 
so that the price of traded goods falls in India as a result of the liberalization.  Everything else 
equal, this induces households to substitute away from the now relatively more expensive school 
and switch towards consumption.  Moreover, everything else equal, lower consumption prices 
raise real wages which further creates incentives for households to move away from schooling.20  
The second term in (1) is the direct nominal wage effect (we ignore the correlation between 
                                                 
20 Falling consumption prices raise real wages and lower the value of the marginal product of labor inside the 
household.  Hence, when children work in both the home and market, lower consumption prices will push children 
towards the formal labor market in our set up.   
 16
changes in child wages and adult wages for a moment).  We regard the direct wage effects of 
India's liberalization as heterogeneous across communities.21  A priori it is not absolutely clear in 
which direction the wage effect should go.  A potentially very compelling scenario is one in 
which districts that are more exposed to trade through bigger tariff cuts might experience 
(everything else equal) proportionately larger declines (or smaller increases) in product demand 
and thus proportionately larger declines (smaller increases) in wages/child labor.  However, one 
could also imagine scenarios whereby child wages increase.  For example, the loss of protection 
might shift employment to less skill intensive industries whereby the demand for child labor 
increases.  Other scenarios are also possible, so we regard the wage effects as ambiguous 
although we view a decline in child wages through the decline in product demand as the most 
likely result of India’s liberalization in heavily protected districts. 
 The third term in (1) is the effect of a change in the return to education δ .  Again, we see 
this as unclear.  On the one hand, the promise of a future with freer trade seems likely to be one 
where education can be rewarded.  On the other hand, there are questions about whether a move 
from import substitution industrialization could lower returns to education.  If India’s 
comparative advantage is in unskilled labor intensive goods (or if tariff cuts were larger on 
skilled-intensive goods), the effect of India's liberalizations will be to reduce returns to schooling 
and thus increase child labor.  Moreover, the loss of tariff revenues and NTB rents might affect 
local public finance in ways that alter educational quality and thereby the returns to education for 
the worse.   
 The fourth term in (1) is the change in the rental price of production inputs.  As with the 
general price level, we expect these to decline, everything else equal.  However, the effects of 
this rental price change is less clear and depends on whether the child works outside of the 
household and the effect of additional capital on the productivity of labor.  When children work 
for wages, their schooling will be determined by the market wage.  Changes in labor productivity 
                                                 
21As we argue in other parts of the paper, most evidence suggests that labor is very immobile across districts of India 
following the trade liberalization episode. 
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in the household will change the allocation of labor between the family and the formal labor 
market but not between work and school.  However, in our data and in other low income 
countries, children typically work mostly in the own household – wage work is rare (Edmonds 
and Pavcnik 2005a).  In this case, child labor and schooling can be affected by whether 
additional child labor complements or substitutes for child labor.  In the typical case, we expect 
additional capital to improve the productivity of labor and to thereby affect a decline in 
schooling in order to maintain equilibrium in the allocation of time (assuming diminishing 
marginal utility of the return to schooling) and increase child labor supply (Moeller 1984).  A 
second possibility is that the additional capital replaces child labor (specifically, lowers the 
marginal product of child labor).  We mention this, because one often reads in the child labor 
literature stories of how children no longer work once their efforts have been replaced by a 
chemical pesticide, a tractor, etc.  We do not have a strong prior on whether changes in the price 
of capital goods and raw material inputs will end up substituting for or complementing child 
labor in household production. 
 The fifth term is the effect of changes in parental income.  Child labor is generally 
viewed as declining with family incomes (everything else equal), and there are theoretical reason 
(Basu and Van 1998) with empirical support (Edmonds 2005) for child labor being especially 
responsive to change in income that lift families out of poverty.  While the general equilibrium 
effects of India's trade liberalization may be important and positive, we know from Topalova 
(2004) that there is a positive correlation between reduction in tariffs and the poverty rate at the 
district level.  As this is the same identifying variation that we use, we expect the (relatively) 
rising poverty associated with India's liberalization to push families away from schooling and 
towards child labor.  Thus, we expect rising poverty coupled with declining consumption prices 
to push families towards child labor and away from schooling.  The ambiguous effects of 
liberalization on nominal child wages and the returns to education coupled with the ambiguous 
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effects of falling input prices on child labor mean that the net effects of all these factors on child 
labor supply and schooling are unclear. 
4.  Empirical Methodology and Basic Results 
Our empirical strategy is straightforward.  Indian districts vary in their exposure to tariff 
changes based on the composition of employment prior to the reforms.  We correlate changes in 
a district’s exposure to international trade based on the composition of district employment 
before liberalization with changes in child labor and schooling in a district.  We use the detailed 
micro data of the NSS to control for changes in individual correlates, but fundamentally the 
variation used for identification of the effects of trade on child labor/schooling is based on the 
district panel dimension of our data.22  dtTariff  is our measure of the district d's exposure to trade 
at time t and is constructed as described in section 2.1.  Let jhdty denote an indicator for 
participation in activity y (i.e. attend school, work, work only) by child j living in household h in 
district d at time (survey round) t.  The measures of these activities of children are detailed in 
section 2.2.  Our base specification is then: 
( )0 1 1,jhdt dt jt jt ht t d jhdty Tariff A G Hβ β π α τ λ ε= + + + + + + .    (2)  
We control for the association between the activities of children and the child's age and gender 
with ( ),jt jtA Gπ , a third order polynomial in the child's age, a gender indicator, and a third order 
polynomial in age interacted with the gender indicator.  htH  is a vector of household 
characteristics including indicators for caste, religion, the head's gender, age, literacy, and 
education that might affect household choice of child activity (potentially because of social 
norms, economic status, . . .).  We control for unobserved changes over time in the activities of 
children with a survey-round fixed effect tτ .  Note, then, that the coefficients on tariffs do not 
capture any aggregate effects of Indian reforms.  Indian districts differ in their endowments, 
schooling facilities, accessibility, geography.  All of these attributes are potentially correlated 
                                                 
22Data on children is a repeated cross-section, but we observe the same districts over time.   
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with tariffs (or industrial composition) and schooling/child labor.  We control for time-invariant 
district attributes with a district fixed effect dλ .  We thus identify the association between activity 
y and average tariff dtT with within district variation in exposure to trade.
23 1β , the coefficient on 
district tariffs, is our main coefficient of interest.  Given the scaling in our data, its interpretation 
is the percentage point change in child labor or schooling rates associated with a doubling of the 
average tariff. 
While the theory on trade and child labor has strong predictions about the mechanisms 
affecting the relationship between trade policy and child labor, it should be clear from our 
discussion in section 3 that we do not have strong priors on which mechanism will dominate in 
the case of India's trade liberalization.  Thus, we follow a more inferential approach in our 
analysis and let the patterns we observe in estimating equation (2) guide our analysis.  
Everything else equal, a negative (positive) value of the coefficient on tariff 1β  in (2) would 
suggest that tariff cuts are associated with increases (decreases) in child labor/schooling. 
 OLS estimates of specification (2) are presented in table 3 for rural and urban sample, 
respectively.   The top panel of the table presents the rural results.  The urban results are in the 
bottom panel.  While child labor is declining and schooling increasing in India over the 1990s, 
we find that child labor increases and schooling declines in districts that experience larger tariff 
declines in rural areas.  We begin by estimating equation (2) for rural sample and school 
attendance as a dependent variable (column 1).  The table reports the coefficient on tariff and the 
coefficients on year indicators24.  As observed in the raw data, the negative coefficient on the 
later year effects suggest that school attendance is in general increasing in rural India over time.  
However, the positive coefficient on tariffs suggests that these increases are smaller in areas that 
experience larger tariff declines.  Everything else equal, tariff declines in rural district are 
                                                 
23Throughout this project, we will estimate equation (2) separately for rural and urban households.  Moreover, 
because our source of variation is district level average tariffs, our standard errors will be clustered at the district 
level. 
241987, a pre-reform year is the base category. 
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associated with declines in school attendance in that district.  To get a sense of the magnitude, 
note that the year effects suggest a 17 percentage point increase in schooling between 1987/88 
and 1999/00 in communities that only experience the general equilibrium effects of India's 
liberalization – that is, with no district specific exposure.  The average district tariff in rural areas 
in 1987/88 was 0.08 and 0.025 in 99/00 (table 1).  This change in tariffs implies, everything else 
equal, a 2 percentage point decline in schooling or that schooling only increased by 15 
percentage points in districts with the average tariff change.   
 Increases in child labor accompany these declines in schooling.  Column 2 reports the 
rural estimates of equation (2) with child labor as a dependent variable.  While the year effects 
suggest that the incidence of child labor is in general declining in rural India, these declines are 
smaller in districts that experience greater tariff cuts.  That is, conditional on the secular trend 
towards declining child labor, greater tariff reductions are associated with more child labor.  At 
the average tariff change, child labor would increase by 1 percentage point.  Finally, column 3 
estimates (2) using an indicator that the child works and does not attend school (work only) as a 
dependent variable.  The column 3 results suggest that most of the increases in child labor as a 
usual primary activity associated with trade liberalization occur among the kids that also do not 
attend school. 
 The strong correlations between changes in tariffs and child labor increases / schooling 
declines that we observe for children 10-14 in rural areas are not evident in urban areas.  This is 
evident in columns 1-3 of the bottom panel of Table 3.  Not only are the associations between the 
outcomes of interest and tariffs statistically insignificant, they are also much smaller in 
magnitude.  We view the large differences between urban and rural areas in responses to tariff 
changes as somewhat surprising.  However, there is relatively little rural-urban migration in 
India surrounding trade liberalization episode (Topalova 2004b), so it is possible that urban and 
rural labor markets could be sufficiently segmented as to experience fundamentally different 
responses to tariff changes (especially with 10 years of the initial reforms).  However, the 
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analysis in the subsequent section reveals that differences in schooling and child labor responses 
in urban and rural areas only occur in the OLS specification and may reflect differences in the 
size of the non-traded sectors between rural and urban areas. 
4.2.  IV estimates 
 The endogeneity of our tariff measure is a primary concern in our empirical work.  The 
coefficient on tariff 1β in (2) is identified under the assumption that unobserved district-specific 
time varying shocks that affect child labor are uncorrelated with changes in district tariffs over 
time.  Recall that our measure of industrial composition used to construct district tariffs is 
determined prior to reform.  Hence, our measure of exposure to reform dtTariff  is not changing 
with changes in industrial composition associated with the reforms (which would be endogenous 
to changes in factors also influencing child labor supply).  The inclusion of a district fixed effect 
controls for time invariant characteristics that might lead to a correlation between child labor and 
the industrial composition of employment in a district.  Yet, latent time trends correlated with the 
pre-reform industrial composition of a district and child labor and schooling are still an 
identification concern. 
 We analyze the robustness of our findings from (2) with a number of checks designed to 
control for these latent time trends.  First, changes in the average tariff measure in (2) depend in 
part on how large the non-traded sectors are in a given district (as they enter the employment 
total but have no change in tariffs).  Child labor is more prevalent in non-traded sectors and in 
agriculture (where some sectors do not experience price changes).  This could lead to a 
correlation between tariff changes and child labor/schooling changes that merely captures time 
trends in child labor and schooling in areas where child labor is more prevalent.  To address this, 
we construct a measure of average tariffs that depends only on employment in traded sectors that 
experience changes in tariffs over the period of study.  We call this the average tariff for traded 
goods in the district and label it dtTrTariff .  This tariff measure will be correlated with the 
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district average tariff dtTariff , but variation in dtTrTariff  won't be influenced directly by the size 
of the pre-reform non-traded sector.  Hence, we instrument for dtTariff  in (2) with dtTrTariff .  
The estimates from the first stage regressions of 2SLS are reported in column 1 (for rural areas) 
and 3 (for urban areas) of table 4.  The average tariff for a district is highly correlated with the 
average tariff on traded goods for a district (i.e. the instrument is not weak).  Columns 1-3 of 
Table 5 contain the reduced form relationship between average tariffs on traded goods in a 
district and schooling/child labor.  In rural and urban sample, we find that, everything else equal, 
declines in average tariffs on traded goods in a district are associated with declines in schooling 
(column 1) and increases in child labor (column 2, 3).   
Columns 4-6 of Table 5 contain the IV estimates of the specification in (2).  In rural and 
urban areas, we find that everything else equal, tariff declines in a district are associated with 
declines in schooling and increases in child labor in that district.  Relative to the OLS estimates 
in table 3, the magnitudes of the declines in schooling and increases in child labor increase 
substantially when we instrument to address endogeneity through the non-traded sector.  We 
view this rise in magnitude as exactly what we would expect if non-traded sectors are relatively 
unaffected by tariff changes.  In the rural areas, everything else equal, the average change in 
tariffs (.055) is associated with a 4 percentage point decline in schooling and a 2 percentage 
point rise in children working without attending school.  The coefficients on tariffs in urban 
sample are lower in magnitude (in absolute value) than rural coefficients. However, because 
urban areas experience on average bigger tariff declines over the period of trade reform (.14, see 
table 1), everything else equal, the average change in district tariffs in urban areas (.14) is 
associated with 6.8 percentage point decline in school attendance and a 4 percentage point 
decline in children working without attending school.25  These are non-negligible effects.   
                                                 
25Appendix table A.1 formally tests for differences between urban and rural responses to tariff declines.  While the 
magnitudes of the coefficients are smaller (in absolute value) in urban areas than in rural areas, one cannot reject 
that urban responses to tariffs are statistically different from the rural responses, with the exception of the OLS 
estimates in columns 1-3. 
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A second, related concern is the endogeneity of trade policy changes subsequent to initial 
reforms.  It should be clear from section 2 that the unusual nature of India's, largely externally 
imposed, trade reforms diminishes this concern.  Moreover, Topalova (2004b) tests for the 
endogeneity of tariff changes to industry characteristics, including latent productivity, and finds 
no evidence to suggest that the direct endogeneity of trade policy is concern.  Nevertheless, we 
are still concerned about the timing of trade policy changes subsequent to initial reforms.  
Moreover, tariff cuts following the initial ones might have been anticipated.  Recall that the goal 
of the reforms was in part to reduce tariff levels and reduce the variation in tariffs.  Thus, the 
change in tariffs in a district will be correlated with the district's baseline tariff level without 
reflecting any endogeneity in trade policy change.  To implement this idea, we also instrument 
for dtTariff  in (2) with dtTrTariff and the baseline traded tariff level interacted with the post-
reform survey round indicator 1987 *d tTrTariff Post .  We allow a different relationship between 
the baseline average traded tariff and each survey round year after the reform to account for 
changes in the reform's progress over time.  These results are in columns 7-9 of Table 5 and do 
not substantively alter our discussion from columns 4-6.26 
The identifying variation in the above analysis is at a district level.  A question arises 
whether the district is the relevant level of aggregation for measuring a household's exposure to 
the trade reforms.  We view this as primarily a measurement error issue.  If the district is too 
aggregate a measure, our findings would be attenuated by the heterogeneity in impacts of trade 
policy within the district.  If the district is not aggregate enough, our findings would be 
attenuated, because the average tariff does not reflect how the household is affected by the trade 
policy reforms.  We can consider this latter case directly by replicating our analysis (and 
reconstructing our tariff measure) at the more aggregate region level. 27   Appendix Tables A.2 
and A.3 replicate the analysis in table 5 for rural and urban sample, respectively.   This analysis 
                                                 
26First stage results for schooling are reported in columns 2 (rural) and 4 (urban) of table 4. 
27There are 77 regions.  
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yields similar findings as the results presented in table 5, albeit the coefficients are larger in 
magnitude.  One reason why looking at the district level could be more than a measurement error 
issue might be if there is significant migration across districts correlated with changes in average 
tariffs.  Topalova (2004b) considers migration directly in our data set, and it is striking how little 
migration there is.  Even in 1999, less than 4 percent of the rural population of India reports 
having moved outside their current district of residence within the last 10 years and less than half 
a percent report moving from outside their current district of residence for employment reasons.    
6.  Robustness Analysis of Basic IV results 
 Although the above IV estimation addresses our principal endogeneity concerns, in this 
section we provide 3 additional checks that the IV estimates are robust to controls for latent time 
trends and time-varying policy variables.   
 First, we address the issue of preexisting time trends in outcome variables that are 
potentially correlated with tariff changes.  We use the information from the two rounds of the 
NSS (33rd and 43rd round ) that took place prior to 1991 trade reform to compute region-specific 
pre-reform change in schooling, child labor, and work only that occurred between 33rd and 43rd 
round of NSS.28  We then allow for outcome variables to experience location specific differential 
time trends by estimating specification (2) with the interactions of location-specific pre-reform 
changes in outcome variables with year indicators.  These results are presented in columns 1-3 of 
table 6 for rural sample and columns 1-3 of table 7 for urban sample.29  Allowing for these 
differential time trends does little to the magnitudes or statistical significance of our estimates.  
The reported coefficients on tariffs are very similar to the IV estimates in table 5.   
Second, child labor is a strong correlate of poverty, and we suspect that poverty might 
vary across districts in ways that are correlated with the composition of employment, potentially 
even employment in traded goods industries.  Thus, we allow changes in child labor and 
schooling to vary with pre-reform industrial structure in a district (i.e. percentage of workers 
                                                 
28 One can compute these changes only at a region level. 
29 Check statistical significance of trends. 
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employed in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, trade, transport, services (construction is the 
omitted category)), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, and the 
percentage of literate population in a district.  That is, we add year round effect that vary with the 
above initial condition in the district to specification (2).  These results are in columns 4-6 of 
Table 6 for rural areas and columns 4-6 of table 7 for urban areas.  Allowing for time effects that 
vary with the baseline industrial structure and other initial conditions reduces the magnitude of 
the coefficients on tariffs in rural areas, but the estimates (especially for schooling) continue to 
be nonnegligible.  The urban estimates continue to be large, but they are very imprecisely 
estimated.   
Third, over the 1990s, substantial policy attention has been directed towards the 
promotion of schooling in India.  A 1993 Supreme Court ruling declared education to be a 
fundamental right up to age 14, and a proposed constitutional amendment in 1997 would 
enshrine education as a fundamental right of children 6-14 (Mehendale 2002).  Several major 
initiatives in the late 1980s and 1990s were designed to increase primary school enrollments 
through improving school quality such as Operation Blackboard (Chin 2002) and the District 
Primary Education Project launched in November 1994 (Pandey 2001).  The relative importance 
of these schooling efforts versus other changes in the environment in explaining improvements 
in schooling in India over the 1990s does not appear to have been resolved.30  Most of our data 
on local public infrastructure that we currently have is at the state level.  Hence, we can consider 
whether changes in state expenditures on education, or schooling availability (measured as 
primary schools per 100,000 middle and secondary schools per 100,000) explain any of the 
association between tariff changes and child labor and schooling by inclusion of these 3 
                                                 
30 Note that these reforms only bias our results if district-level schooling reforms are correlated with district level 
tariff changes.  Moreover, to the extent these reforms were implemented differentially across districts with different 
initial school attendance or poverty, we in part control for them by allowing for differential trending of outcome 
variables across districts with different initial conditions and pre-existing changes in outcome variables. 
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measures in IV estimates of specification (2).  The results are reported in table 8 and the 
inclusion of these time-varying state controls does not alter our main findings.31 
6.  Conclusions  
 We consider the effect of trade policy changes on child labor and schooling by exploiting 
within country heterogeneity in the exposure to economy-wide trade reforms.  This study 
provides a methodological contribution in exploring how the heterogeneity in regional impacts of 
economy-wide reforms can be analyzed (although we cannot estimate the overall effect of the 
economy-wide reforms) and provides novel evidence on the direct effects of trade policy on 
child labor and schooling.  In particular, we find that in the case of India, districts that 
experienced larger declines in tariffs did not experience as large a rise in schooling or decline in 
child labor as did the rest of India.  That is, everything else equal, larger tariff reductions are 
associated with less schooling and more child labor.  For example, in rural areas (table 5, 
columns 7-9), the data imply at the sample means a tariff elasticity of schooling of 0.87 and a 
tariff elasticity of child labor -1.53.  It is important to emphasize that these estimated effects are 
not the total effect of a tariff change; rather, they reflect differential changes in areas with more 
exposure to the tariff reform after controlling for any economy wide changes associated with the 
tariff changes or other economic factors. 
 While these patterns are extremely robust, further work is necessary to understand why 
we observe these relative declines in schooling and increases in child labor.  We suspect that an 
important part of the story is in Topalova (2004b) who documents higher relative poverty in 
areas where we observe declines in schooling and increases in child labor.  Thus, the patterns 
observed herein are consistent the idea that child labor declines with poverty as Edmonds and 
Pavcnik (2005b) observed in the context of rice trade liberalization in Vietnam.  We are also 
interested in exploring whether the patterns observed in the data vary with the local institutional 
environment.  Topalova (2004b) documents that her findings of increased poverty vary with state 
                                                 
31In future work we need to obtain state-level measures on Operation Blackboard from Chin (2002) so that we can 
perform an additional robustness check. 
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institutional characteristics, such as the extent to which it regulates labor or enforces existing 
labor laws.  Given that the informal nature of most child labor, we do not expect to find much of 
direct effect of these attributes beyond their effect on family incomes.  However, ultimately the 
data will inform this question. 
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Table 1: Tariff Measures
Rural Urban
87/88 99/00 87/88 99/00
District 
Average Tariff (Tariff) .080 .025 .214 .074
Average Tariff on Traded Goods (Trtariff) .883 .308 .903 .318
Agricultural Tariff .812 .230 .770 .211
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff .911 .343 .923 .333
Region
Average Tariff (Tariff) .080 .025 .216 .074
Average Tariff on  Traded Goods (Trtariff) .880 .304 .907 .318
Agricultural Tariff .816 .230 .775 .213
Mining and Manufacturing Tariff .915 .345 .930 .334
Note:  Tariff is the employment weighted average nominal ad-valorem tariff at time t in a district/region 
(employment weights are based on pre-liberalization employment shares in a district/region).  Workes in 
nontraded industries (service, trade, transportation, construction, workers in growing of cereals and 
oilseeds) are assigned zero tariffs in all years in this measure.  Average tariff on traded goods is 
employment-weighted tariff over the set of traded industries (i.e. it abstracts from individuals working in 
nontraded industries in a given district/region).  All means are weighted.  The tariff measure for 87/88 
round is based on tariff information for 1987.  Tariff measure for 99/00 round is based on tariff 
information for 1997.  
Table 2: Activities of Children in India, 1983-2000
National Rural Urban
1983 87/88 99/00 1983 87/88 99/00 1983 87/88 99/00
Attend School 54.2 59.8 75.8 48.5 55.1 72.8 73.0 76.2 84.9
Work 31.6 22.2 12.4 36.0 25.0 14.1 16.9 12.3 7.3
Work Only 31.1 21.7 12.0 35.5 24.5 13.6 16.5 11.9 7.0
Market Work 16.6 12.0 6.6 19.3 13.7 7.5 7.5 6.0 3.7
  household ent. 9.9 6.9 3.4 11.9 8.2 4.0 3.2 2.6 1.3
  wage work 6.5 5.0 3.2 7.1 5.5 3.5 4.2 3.4 2.4
  begging 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
domestic work 15.1 10.2 5.9 16.7 11.2 6.6 9.4 6.3 3.6
Note:  Each cell contains the participation rate in the indicated activity (row) for the indicated survey round of the National Sample Survey 
(column) for children ages 10-14. Information on participation in types of work is based on the child's principal usual activity.  Domestic 
work includes chores, collection activities, and sewing, tailoring, weaving, etc for household use.  Market work includes work in a household 
enterprise such as a farm or business, wage work, and begging.  Work refers to participation in market work or domestic work as a principal 
usual activity.  Work only indicates that the child reports market or domestic work as a principal usual activity and does not report attending 
school.  All means are weighted to be nationally representative. All means are weighted by survey weights. 
Table 3: Tariffs, Schooling, and Child Labor --OLS Results
OLS
 School Work Work only
(1) (2) (3)
RURAL 
Tariff 0.367 -0.173 -0.18
(0.092) (0.073) (0.073)
Year (99/00) 0.172 -0.103 -0.104
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes
                                                                                                             
R2 0.2537 0.1944 0.1946
Number of Observations 95,669 95,695 95,669
URBAN
Tariff 0.044 -0.015 -0.021
(0.116) (0.071) (0.072)
Year (99/00) 0.081 -0.046 -0.046
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes
R2 0.208 0.137 0.137
Number of Observations 48,871 48,915 48,871
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level.   Demographic 
controls include third order polynomial in child's age and gender.  Household 
controls include an indicator for whether a child's household belongs to a 
scheduled caste or schedule tribe, indicators for whether the child's household is 
hindu, muslim, christian, sikh, and controls for the head of the child's household 
gender, age, education, and literacy.      
Table 4: First Stage Results
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Tariff for Traded Goods (TrTariff) .3430 .5650 .4410 .5020
(.0840) (.0950) (.0990) (.2210)
TrTariff*Post 1991 Dummy .2580          .0500
(.0650)          (.1490)
District Indicators yes yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes
F statistic for joint significance of instruments 16.71 17.61 20.07 10.31
R2 .864 .878 .922 .922
Number Observations 95,669 95,669 48,915 48,915
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level.  Regressions also include third order polynomial 
in child's age and gender, an indicator for whether a child's household belongs to a scheduled caste or schedule 
tribe, indicators for whether the child's household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh, and controls for the head of 
the child's household gender, age, education, and literacy.   
Table 5: Tariffs, Schooling, and Child Labor--Reduced Form and Instrumental Variables Results
REDUCED FORM IV 1 IV 2 
 School Work Work only School Work Work only School Work Work only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RURAL 
Tariff 0.737 -0.397 -0.408 0.564 -0.25 -0.258
(0.241) (0.166) (0.168) (0.212) (0.139) (0.139)
TrTariff 0.253 -0.136 -0.14
(0.071) (0.051) (0.052)
Year (99/00) 0.299 -0.173 -0.175 0.192 -0.116 -0.116 0.183 -0.108 -0.108
(0.042) (0.031) (0.031) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.2536 0.1945 0.1946 0.2532 0.1942 0.1943 0.2535 0.1944 0.1946
Number of Observations 95,669 95,695 95,669 95,669 95,695 95,669 95,669 95,695 95,669
URBAN
Tariff                            0.488 -0.295 -0.301 0.503 -0.297 -0.306
                           (0.249) (0.132) (0.135) (0.252) (0.135) (0.138)
TrTariff 0.215 -0.13 -0.133                                                       
(0.111) (0.059) (0.060)                                                       
Year (99/00) 0.201 -0.12 -0.12 0.14 -0.083 -0.083 0.142 -0.083 -0.084
(0.064) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.018) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019) (0.019)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.209 0.137 0.137 0.207 0.136 0.136 0.207 0.136 0.136
Number of Observations 48,871 48,915 48,871 48,871 48,915 48,871 48,871 48,915 48,871
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level.   Demographic controls include third order polynomial in child's age and gender.  Household controls include an indicator for 
whether a child's household belongs to a scheduled caste or schedule tribe, indicators for whether the child's household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh, and controls for the head of the 
child's household gender, age, education, and literacy.     Trtariff (ie.average tariff on traded goods) is employment-weighted  tariff over the set of traded industries (i.e. it abstracts from 
individuals working in nontraded industries in a given district. Initial Trtariff is the value of Trtariff in 1987.  Specification IV 1 uses trtariff as an instrument.  Specification IV 2 uses trtariff 
and its pre-reform 1987 value interacted with post indicator as instruments.
Table 6: Tariffs, Schooling, and Child Labor in Rural India--Robustness Analysis
School Work Work only School Work Work only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariff 0.739 -0.401 -0.407 0.37 -0.116 -0.121
(0.253) (0.175) (0.175) (0.187) (0.143) (0.145)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial Conditions*Year Dummies no no no yes yes yes
Pre-reform Change in Outcome 
of interest*Year Dummies yes yes yes no no no
R2 0.2541 0.1956 0.1957 0.2559 0.1962 0.1965
Number of Observations 95,669 95,695 95,669 95,669 95,695 95,669
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level.   Table 5 notes describe the variables and other controls. Initial conditions that are 
interacted with year indicators include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture,  employed in mining, employed in 
manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s 
population that is a scheduled caste/tribe,  the percentage of literate population in a district, and state-labor laws indicators.  Instrument is 
Trtariff.
Table 7: Tariffs, Schooling, and Child Labor in Urban India--Robustness Analysis
School Work Work only School Work Work only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariff 0.465 -0.303 -0.309 1.02 -0.422 -0.459
(0.247) (0.136) (0.138) (0.563) (0.392) (0.393)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial Conditions*Year Dummies no no no yes yes yes
Pre-reform Change in Outcome of 
interest*Year Dummies yes yes yes no no no
R2 0.2072 0.1355 0.1358 0.2099 0.1374 0.1376
Number of Observations 48,871 48,915 48,871 48,871 48,915 48,871
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level.   Table 5 notes describe the variables and other controls. Initial conditions that are 
interacted with year indicators include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture,  employed in mining, employed in 
manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s 
population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, and the percentage of literate population in a district.
Table 8: Tariffs, Schooling, and Child Labor in Rural India--Time Varying State-level Education Controls
Rural Urban
School Work Work only School Work Work only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariff 0.784 -0.469 -0.514 0.566 -0.292 -0.297
(0.351) (0.354) (0.365) (0.251) (0.140) (0.141)
Education Spending 0.003 0.022 0.024 0.04 0.004 0.002
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of Middle Schools 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0 0
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Primary Schools 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.2595 0.2049 0.2043 0.217 0.143 0.142
Number of Observations 79,057 79,078 79,057 41,604 41,637 41,604
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level.   Table 5 notes describe the variables and other controls. Data:  43rd and 55th 
rounds of the National Sample Survey.  Education controls are all at the state level.
Table A.1: Tariffs, Schooling, and Child Labor --Urban and Rural Comparison
OLS REDUCED FORM IV 1 IV 2 
 School Work Work only  School Work Work only School Work Work only School Work Work only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Tariff 0.374 -0.176 -0.183                            0.744 -0.398 -0.41 0.575 -0.259 -0.266
(0.091) (0.073) (0.073)                            (0.240) (0.165) (0.166) (0.212) (0.139) (0.139)
Tariff*Urban -0.331 0.161 0.162                            -0.262 0.112 0.118 -0.082 -0.027 -0.028
(0.147) (0.100) (0.100)                            (0.334) (0.208) (0.212) (0.324) (0.194) (0.196)
TrTariff                            0.255 -0.137 -0.141                                                       
                           (0.071) (0.051) (0.052)                                                       
TrTariff*Urban                            -0.042 0.01 0.012                                                       
                           (0.128) (0.075) (0.078)                                                       
Year (99/00) 0.172 -0.103 -0.104 0.301 -0.173 -0.176 0.193 -0.116 -0.116 0.183 -0.108 -0.108
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.042) (0.031) (0.031) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Year (99/00)*Urban -0.091 0.057 0.057 -0.101 0.055 0.057 -0.053 0.033 0.034 -0.042 0.025 0.025
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.074) (0.045) (0.046) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.255 0.187 0.187 0.255 0.187 0.187 0.254 0.186 0.186 0.254 0.186 0.187
Number of Observations 144,540 144,610 144,540 144,540 144,610 144,540 144,540 144,610 144,540 144,540 144,610 144,540
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at district level.   Table 5 notes describe the variables and other controls. Data:  43rd and 55th rounds of the National Sample Survey.  
Table A.2: Tariffs, Schooling, and Child Labor in Rural India--Region Level Analysis
OLS REDUCED FORM IV 1 IV 2 
 School Work Work only  School Work Work only School Work Work only School Work Work only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Tariff 0.551 -0.236 -0.241 1.092 -0.742 -0.749 0.861 -0.467 -0.472
(0.160) (0.146) (0.146) (0.394) (0.332) (0.334) (0.292) (0.231) (0.234)
TrTariff 0.368 -0.25 -0.253
(0.082) (0.078) (0.079)
Year (99/00) 0.179 -0.104 -0.104 0.365 -0.239 -0.24 0.208 -0.132 -0.132 0.196 -0.117 -0.117
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.050) (0.046) (0.047) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.2386 0.1801 0.1805 0.2388 0.1805 0.1808 0.238 0.1794 0.1797 0.2384 0.18 0.1803
Number of Observations 95,943 95,969 95,943 95,943 95,969 95,943 95,943 95,969 95,943 95,943 95,969 95,943
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at region level.   Trtariff (ie.average tariff on traded goods) is employment-weighted  tariff over the set of traded industries (i.e. it abstracts from individuals working in nontraded industries in a 
given region. Initial Trtariff is the value of Trtariff in 1987. Table 5 notes describe the variables and other controls. 
Table A.3: Tariffs, Schooling, and Child Labor in Urban India--Regional Analysis
OLS REDUCED FORM IV 1 IV 2 
 School Work Work only  School Work Work only School Work Work only School Work Work only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Tariff 0.198 -0.081 -0.094                            0.556 -0.441 -0.46 0.6 -0.437 -0.459
(0.168) (0.100) (0.101)                            (0.309) (0.177) (0.187) (0.319) (0.181) (0.193)
TrTariff                            0.289 -0.229 -0.239                                                       
                           (0.176) (0.081) (0.084)                                                       
Year (99/00) 0.1 -0.053 -0.055 0.243 -0.177 -0.182 0.148 -0.101 -0.103 0.153 -0.101 -0.103
(0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (0.101) (0.048) (0.050) (0.041) (0.025) (0.026) (0.043) (0.026) (0.027)
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.194 0.123 0.123 0.194 0.123 0.123 0.193 0.122 0.122 0.193 0.122 0.122
Number of Observations 49,165 49,210 49,165 49,165 49,210 49,165 49,165 49,210 49,165 49,165 49,210 49,165
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at region level.   Table 5 notes describe the variables and other controls. Data:  43rd and 55th rounds of the National Sample Survey.  
